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MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs--CHARTBR AMmroMENT-StmMISSION OP
THREE PROPOSITIONS IN nm FoRM oP ONB QuBSTION-The council of defendant city adopted a resolution whereby the city charter was to be amended to
authorize a limitation of I% per annum on property taxes, an excise tax of I%
per annum on salaries, commisions and profits of both nonresidents and residents, and disposition of the monies received by the income tax. The proposed
charter revision was approved by the qualified electors by a margin slightly less
than two to one. The plaintiffs, electors and residents of the city, obtained an
injunction against enforcement of the charter amendment. On appeal, held,
affirmed. The charter revision was ineffectual since three distinct propositions
were submitted to the electors in the form of one question, contrary to a
Michigan statute. 1 House v. City of Saginaw, 334 Mich. 241, 54 N.W. (2d)
314 (1952).
It is generally said that two or more propositions cannot be submitted in the
form of one question on a ballot.2 The policy consideration behind the general
limitation has been expressed in this manner: "The vice of 'doubleness' in
submissions at elections is universally condemned. It is regarded as a species
of legal fraud, because it may compel the voter, in order to get what he earnestly
wants, to vote for something he does not want."3 As a practical matter, however,
the courts were not slow to recognize that in some situations it may be highly
desirable to allow submissions of two propositions in the form of one question.4

1Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §117.21.
229 C.J.S., Elections §170 (1941); see Hart v. Board of Education, 299 Mo. 36 at
40, 252 S.W. 441 (1923), where the court said: "If it can be said that the proposed
improvements are not naturally related or connected, then it is clear that separate submissions are required."
s Hart v. Board of Education, supra note 2, at 39.
4 See Cary v. Blodgett, 10 Cal. App. 463 at 470, 102 P. 668 (1909), where the court
said: "The elector cannot complain because he was not afforded the opportunity to vote £or
one proposition or against the other•••• The fact is that the elector can scarcely ever vote
upon the precise proposition which, of all the possible and authorized propositions he
prefers."
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Accordingly, the courts worked out an exception to the limitation which is
generally called the reasonable relation rule. 5 Thus where the practical aspects
of one proposition are so entwined with a different proposition that one cannot
be done without the other, the courts will usually allow submissions of both in
the form of one question on the theory that they are reasonably related.6 While
the rule stated is broad, there is a fair unanimity of decisions.7 The difficulty
comes, however, not in the rule, but in its application to facts. As might be
expected, some courts have gone far in giving a liberal interpretation to
"reasonable relation,"8 while others so restrict the rule that it is doubtful whether
two propositions may be submitted on the ballot in the form of one question
no matter how closely related. 9 The great bulk of the decisions lie somewhere
between the two extremes.10 The instant case clearly shows the desirability of
allowing reasonably related propositions to be presente~ as a single question and
the unfortunate ~ffects of requiring separate submissions. The city officials
cannot afford to reduce the property tax limit unless assured of the other
source of revenue. They could probably not secure passage of the income tax
amendment without guaranteeing to the voters a reduction in property taxes.
By submitting the two proposals together, they allow the residents to choose
between alternative methods of taxation. Practically, this choice may now be
denied those residents, since it will now be necessary to secure the passage of the
income tax authorization as a separate proposition, with no assurance to the
voters that a corresponding reduction in property taxes will be forthcoming. 11
The Michigan court, however, is not responsible for abandonment of the
reasonable relation rule. In 1939 the Michigan Legislature enacted a statute
which completely destroyed the reasonable relation rule in Michigan.12 It
provided, inter alia, that "Any proposed amendment shall be confined to 1
subject and in case a subject should embrace more than I related.18 proposition,
29 C.J.S., Elections §170 (1941).
Lewis v. Leon County, 91 Fla. 118, 107 S. 146 (1926); Aylmore v. Hamilton, 74
Wash. 433, 133 P. 1027 (1913); Clark v. Manhattan Beach, 175 Cal. 637, 166 P. 806
(1917).
.
7 See 4 A.L.R. (2d) 619 (1949).
BBlaine v. Hamilton, 64 Wash. 353, 116 P. 1076 (1911); Coleman v. Eutaw, 157
Ala. 327, 47 S. 703 (1908).
9Jn re Validation Bonds, 170 Miss. 886, 156 S. 516 (1934); Cain v. Smith, 117 Ga.
902, 44 S.E. 5 (1903).
10 4 A.L.R. (2d) 623 (1949).
11 Another example of the practical problems that arise when the reasonable relation
rule is not applied may be found in TrME MAGAZINE, p. 124 (Nov. 24, 1952) where it is
reported: ''In Waldick, N.J., the borough council pondered the situation handed them
when the electorate, on three referendums, voted: 1) to start a full-time marshal system,
2) to keep the old marshal system (one man on call for 24 hours), 3) to refuse the
council's request for $20,000 to pay for full-time marshal protection."
12 Mich. Pub. Act No. 279, effective Sept. 29, 1939. This act amended §§2257 and
2261 of the Compiled Laws of Michigan (1929). Previous to the act, there was no statutory provision regarding the number of propositions that might be submitted in the form
of one question.
1s Emphasis supplied.
5
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each proposition shall be separately stated. . . ."14 Before enactment of the
statute, Michigan was counted among the followers of the reasonable relation
rule.15 However, there is some indication that the Michigan cour1; is not completely satisfied with the statute and has circumscribed it to the extent that
Michigan might be said to be among the more conservative followers of th~
rule.16 This is done by terming the reasonably related propositions a single
proposition and thus avoiding the statute in an exceedingly meritorious case.
Apparently, the court in the instant case did not feel that the case for submission of the three proposals in the form of one question was sufficiently
strong to merit judicial avoidance of a statute. While the result seems poor,
the court is not without justification since the function of the judiciary, in the
absence of constitutional limitations, is to apply, and not avoid, legislative
actions. The responsibility for the present situation in Saginaw· lies with the
legislature and not the court.
Joseph M. Kortenhof, S.Ed.

14Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §117.21.
15 Kelly v. Laing, 259 Mich. 212, 242 N.W. 891 (1932); Westcott v. Bonner, 230
Mich. 317, 202 N.W. 931 (1925).
16 Michigan Public Service Co. v. City of Cheboygan, 324 Mich. 309 at 334, 37 N.W.
(2d) 116 (1949). The court used the following rather pragmatic language in the face of
the statute: ''If they [related propositions] were to be submitted separately, the authority to
issue bonds might be approved while the constitutional requirement for a franchise to set
up terms in event of a default might be rejected."

